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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________  
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Linda Stone sued Troy Construction Inc. (“Troy”), on 
behalf of herself and others similarly situated, alleging a 
willful violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”).  
She claims that Troy paid local employees per diem 
compensation that should have been classified as wages and 
included in the regular rate of pay, which would in turn have 
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affected the calculation of overtime pay.  The District Court 
was unpersuaded and granted summary judgment for Troy, 
holding that, as a matter of law, there had been no willful 
violation of the FLSA.  Whether a violation is willful 
determines the length of the applicable statute of limitations.  
In light of its holding that there had been no willfulness in 
this case, the Court applied a two-year statute of limitations 
and concluded that Stone’s claims were time-barred.  Because 
the Court, in effect, applied an incorrect standard in deciding 
the willfulness question, we will vacate and remand. 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
A. Factual Background1 
 
 Troy builds and maintains oil and gas pipelines and 
compressor stations across the country, including in 
Pennsylvania, where Stone worked.  During the relevant 
period, many of Troy’s employees had to travel long 
distances from their permanent residences to their 
Pennsylvania worksites, but Troy acknowledges that it also 
“often hired employees closer to [those] worksites[.]”  (App. 
at 63.)  We will refer to the long-distance travelers as “non-
local employees” and the local commuters as “local 
employees.”  When hiring a new employee, Troy required 
him or her to fill out a W-4 form for tax purposes, an I-9 
immigration form to verify employment eligibility, and a 
                                                 
 1 Summary judgment was granted for Troy on the issue 
of willfulness, so we view the facts and draw all reasonable 
inferences in Stone’s favor.  Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms, Inc., 
579 F.3d 285, 286 (3d Cir. 2009). 
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form of Troy’s own making to get background information 
about the employee (collectively, the “New Hire Forms”).2  
The New Hire Forms included a space for the employee to 
note his or her permanent address.   
 
 Because non-local employees had to travel long 
distances to their worksites, Troy paid them a per diem to 
cover their travel costs.  During discovery, Troy, through a 
corporate designee, defined the term “per diem” in this 
context as “a reimbursable -- [i]t’s a payment to an employee 
for a reimbursable expense.”  (App. at 68.)  Specifically, the 
“intent of the per diem” was to reimburse out-of-pocket 
expenses “[r]elated to traveling to the job, … lodging while 
the job’s going on, [and] meals.”  (App. at 69.)  Troy paid per 
diems to both local and non-local employees, unless an 
employee opted out by affirmatively telling Troy not to pay 
the per diem “[a]t the time of hiring.”  (App. at 69.)  
                                                 
 2 A “W-4” is a “form indicating the number of 
personal exemptions an employee is claiming and that is used 
by the employer in determining the amount of income to be 
withheld from the employee’s paycheck for federal-income 
tax purposes.”  W-4 form, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 
2019).  An “I-9 Form requires applicants to check one of 
three boxes, attesting under penalty of perjury that they are 
either a ‘citizen or national of the United States,’ or a ‘lawful 
permanent resident’ (and if so, supplying their alien 
identification number), or an ‘alien authorized to work until 
____’ (and if so, providing the expiration date of their work 
authorization).”  United States v. Garcia-Ochoa, 607 F.3d 
371, 373-74 (4th Cir. 2010). 
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Unsurprisingly, Troy has not identified a single employee 
who did so.     
 
 For local employees, the per diems often represented a 
large fraction of their income.  For instance, Troy paid Stone 
a per diem of $109 in addition to her hourly wage of $10.75.  
Thus, even factoring in overtime, the per diems accounted for 
around 40-56% of Stone’s total weekly income from Troy.   
 
 In January 2014, Troy, heeding advice from its 
accountants, started treating per diems paid to local 
employees as taxable income to those employees.  Troy made 
that tax-accounting change because it understood that a per 
diem paid to local employees would not have been viewed by 
the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) as a proper 
reimbursement.  Instead, the per diem “would have rolled up 
into [an employee’s] wage box[,]” on federal income tax 
returns.  (App. at 74 (emphasis added).)  The company was 
thus at pains to distinguish between local and non-local 
employees to ensure that per diems paid to local employees 
were reported to the IRS as taxable wages.  
 
 Despite changing its accounting practice, Troy did not 
include per diem payments to local employees in its 
calculation of those employees’ regular rate of pay when 
determining the company’s overtime obligations.  Troy 
admitted that a travel per diem paid to a local employee 
would not be a reimbursement, but nonetheless, for overtime 
purposes, the company treated all per diems, whether paid to 
local or non-local employees, the same way.3   
                                                 
 3 “Q. … So making [the per diem for local 
employees] taxable, did Troy Construction no longer 
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 Linda Stone was a local employee of Troy beginning 
in January 2013.  She was fired in March 2013.  The reasons 
for her short tenure and termination are immaterial to this 
suit.  She received nine paychecks from Troy, the first on 
January 18, 2013, and the last on March 15, 2013.  She was 
paid per diems, but they were not reflected in her overtime 
compensation. 
   
B. Procedural Posture 
 
 In February 2014, Stone filed the present collective 
action, claiming Troy had willfully violated the FLSA, 29 
U.S.C. § 201, et seq.4  (App. at 29.)  She alleges that Troy 
paid per diems that were not “a legitimate, reasonable 
reimbursement of expenses incurred” and that she had 
received per diems that “should have been included in her 
                                                                                                             
 
consider it a reimbursement?  A. We treated [it] as a per 
diem. We didn’t know if they were using the per diem or 
not.”  (App. at 75.)   
 
 4 In addition, Stone alleged two violations of the 
Pennsylvania Wage Laws, including failure to pay overtime 
compensation and failure to pay wages earned.  Stone does 
not challenge that decision and we leave it to the District 
Court to reconsider whether to exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction over Stone’s state-law claims on remand.  Upon 
dismissal of the FLSA claim, the District Court “decline[d] to 
retain supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state 
claims” (App. at 17), and Stone does not challenge that 
decision.   
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regular [wage] rate.”  (App. at 36.)  The regular wage rate for 
an employee is supposed to be calculated to include “all 
remuneration for employment paid to, or on behalf of, the 
employee.”  29 U.S.C. § 207(e).  But it does not include 
“reasonable payments for traveling expenses, or other 
expenses, incurred by an employee in the furtherance of his 
employer’s interests and properly reimbursable by the 
employer; and other similar payments to an employee which 
are not made as compensation for his hours of 
employment[.]”  Id. § 207(e)(2); see also DOL Field 
Operations Handbook § 32d05a(b) (Feb. 11, 1972) (“[W]here 
an employee receives [per diems] but actually incurs no such 
additional expenses, the entire amount of the payments shall 
be included in determining the regular rate.”).  Stone’s 
lawsuit sought to recover unpaid compensation that she says 
would have been paid for overtime work if her base wage rate 
had correctly reflected the per diem payments she received.   
 
 A little over a year into the lawsuit, Troy asked Stone 
to consent to Troy having “extra time” to submit a responsive 
filing in the District Court.  (App. at 102.)  Troy’s counsel 
had scheduling conflicts, and Stone’s counsel agreed to an 
extension, conditioned upon Troy “agree[ing] to toll the 
statute for the class for the extra time[.]”   (App. at 102.)  
Troy did agree, stating “[w]e … agree to toll the statute of 
limitations pertaining to the FLSA claim for the same period 
of time for which the Court grants us an extension[.]”  (App. 
at 103.)  Pursuant to that agreement, the District Court 
ordered that “[t]he statute of limitations pertaining to the 
FLSA claim shall be tolled from April 13, 2015 to April 27, 
2015, at which time it will begin to run again.”  (App. at 104.) 
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 In December 2015, Stone moved for, and the District 
Court granted, conditional certification of her case as an 
FLSA collective action.  In support of that motion, Stone 
attached a sworn affidavit describing Troy’s per diem 
payment practice.  Many former Troy employees filed 
consent forms to join Stone’s collective action, in accordance 
with the statutory requirement that “[n]o employee shall be a 
party plaintiff to any such action unless he gives his consent 
in writing to become such a party and such consent is filed in 
the court in which such action is brought.”  29 U.S.C. 
§ 216(b).  Stone also filed her own formal consent-to-sue 
form, but not until March 22, 2016.5  She later contended, and 
still maintains, that her December 2015 affidavit in support of 
conditional certification of the collective action should suffice 
as her consent to sue.   
 
 Troy and Stone both moved for summary judgment.  
In Troy’s motion, it argued that Stone’s FLSA claim was 
time-barred because she had failed to file a timely consent-to-
sue form, as “[t]he law provides that FLSA claims must be 
commenced within two years after the cause of action 
accrued, or within three years if the cause of action arises out 
of a willful violation.”  (App. at 8 (citing 29 U.S.C. 
                                                 
 5 “Unlike in a Rule 23 class action, where each person 
who falls within the class definition is considered to be a class 
member and bound by the judgment unless she has opted out, 
a plaintiff … must affirmatively opt into [an FLSA collective] 
action by filing [her] written consent with the court in order to 
be considered a class member and be bound by the outcome 
of the action.”  Mickles v. Country Club Inc., 887 F.3d 1270, 
1275-76 (11th Cir. 2018) (third alteration in original) (citation 
and internal quotation marks omitted).  
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§ 255(a)).)  In Stone’s motion, she argued that the record had 
established that Troy had “willfully violated the FLSA as a 
matter of law” (App. at 122), and so, with application of the 
three-year statute of limitations, her claim was timely.  In 
opposing Stone’s motion for summary judgment, Troy 
declared that “genuine disputes [of fact] exist regarding 
whether Troy recklessly disregarded its FLSA obligations.”  
(App. at 137.)  
 
 The District Court granted summary judgment for 
Troy.  It rested its decision on its conclusion that, as a matter 
of law, Troy had not willfully violated the FLSA.  The Court 
made that determination because, in its view, “there [were] 
insufficient facts for a factfinder to reasonably conclude that 
the defendant’s conduct amounts to … [a willful] FLSA 
violation.”  (App. at 10.)  Accordingly, despite Troy’s 
admission that genuine disputes existed as to its willfulness, 
the Court determined that a two-year statute of limitations for 
non-willful violations applied to Stone’s claims, and her 
claims were thus untimely.   
 
 Stone timely appealed.   
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II. DISCUSSION6 
 
The District Court erred in granting summary 
judgment for Troy, a result of applying an overly burdensome 
standard for showing willfulness under the FLSA.7  Under the 
proper standard, summary judgment was not warranted 
because genuine disputes of material fact do indeed exist as to 
Troy’s willfulness in leaving out of the base wage rate for 
local employees the per diems they were paid.  If, after 
appropriate fact-finding, it should be determined that Troy 
                                                 
6 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1331 and 1367.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of the District Court’s grant of 
summary judgment is plenary.  Capps v. Mondelez Glob., 
LLC, 847 F.3d 144, 151 (3d Cir. 2017).  A moving party is 
entitled to summary judgment if “there is no genuine dispute 
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  There is a genuine 
dispute of material fact “if the evidence is such that a 
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving 
party.”  Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 
(1986).  “In making this determination, we must view the 
facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and 
draw all inferences in that party’s favor.”  Prowel, 579 F.3d at 
286 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
  
 7 In addition to challenging the merits of the District 
Court’s grant of summary judgment, Stone argued that 
summary judgment in Troy’s favor was improper because it 
was granted sua sponte.   Because we conclude that summary 
judgment was inappropriate in light of genuine disputes of 
material fact, we need not address that argument. 
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was willful, Stone’s opportunity to recover will not be 
entirely time-barred.   
 
A. Willfulness Does Not Require Egregious 
 Behavior  
 
 The fundamental question in this case is not new.  
Over thirty years ago, in McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 
486 U.S. 128 (1988), the Supreme Court addressed “the 
meaning of the word ‘willful’ as used in the statute of 
limitations applicable to civil actions to enforce the Fair 
Labor Standards Act[.]”  Id. at 129.  It noted that “[t]he 
[FLSA] provides that such actions must be commenced 
within two years ‘except that a cause of action arising out of a 
willful violation may be commenced within three years after 
the cause of action accrued.’”  Id.  (emphasis added) (citation 
omitted).  Then, based on legislative history and the common 
and legal usage of the word “willful” – “considered 
synonymous with such words as voluntary, deliberate, and 
intentional” – the Court concluded that a violation of the 
FLSA was willful if, at minimum, the employer “showed 
reckless disregard for the matter of whether its conduct was 
prohibited by the [FLSA.]”  Id. at 132-33 (citations and 
internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
 The District Court here required a showing of conduct 
worse than the recklessness identified in McLaughlin.  It 
reasoned that “[t]he sole evidence that plaintiffs point to is a 
2014 policy change at Troy that determined that per diems 
paid to employees that permanently resided less than 50 miles 
from their Troy worksite were to be considered wages for tax 
purposes.”  (App. at 10-11 (citation omitted).)  In 
characterizing the record as such, the District Court elided the 
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corporate designee’s repeated statements that “unless the 
employee t[old] [Troy] otherwise, [Troy] assumed that 
they’re an out-of-town employee and [it] pa[id] the per 
diem.”  (App. 73; see also App. 69, 72, 86.)  The Court was 
satisfied with Troy’s rebuttal “that it did not think that the 
change would implicate the FLSA[,]” and so, as a matter of 
law, there was no willfulness.  (App. at 11.)  Yet the Court 
recognized that Troy “appear[ed] to agree that excluding per 
diem[s] when calculating overtime rates for [out-of-state] 
employees is acceptable under the statute.”  (App. at 11.)  
Thus, Troy knew that per diems for non-local employees 
were implicated and permissible under the FLSA, but Troy’s 
professed ignorance about the implications of the same per 
diems paid to local employees did not trouble the Court.  That 
analysis gives us pause, as it does not give Stone the benefit 
of a fair inference that Troy did recognize the implication of 
the per diems paid to local employees. 
 
 While the District Court did not explicitly state that 
Stone had to demonstrate that Troy’s actions were worse than 
reckless, that is what it in effect required.  The District Court 
was evidently looking for something egregious.  But any 
requirement for a degree of egregious behavior conflicts 
directly with another Supreme Court precedent.  In Hazen 
Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604 (1993), the Supreme 
Court made clear that an “employee need not additionally 
demonstrate that the employer’s conduct was outrageous,” to 
demonstrate willfulness.8  Id. at 617.  Requiring a showing of 
                                                 
 8 Hazen addressed the willfulness standard under the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), which 
the Court equated through analogy and explicit reference to 
the FLSA.  507 U.S. at 614-15.  “The word ‘willful’ is widely 
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egregious conduct is tantamount to requiring proof of 
outrageous conduct, and, thus, is not properly part of the 
willfulness inquiry.9   
 
 Troy tries to justify the District Court’s more severe 
test by citing our decision in Souryavong v. Lackawanna 
County, 872 F.3d 122 (3d Cir. 2017).  According to Troy, 
“Souryavong makes clear that establishing a willful violation 
requires … a degree of egregiousness[.]”  (Answering Br. at 
17.)  We disagree. 
 
We directly addressed the difference between 
egregiousness and willfulness in our post-Souryavong opinion 
in Bedrosian v. United States, 912 F.3d 144 (3d Cir. 2018).  
That case involved a civil penalty for a failure to report 
certain foreign banking activity.  Id. at 147-48, 152.  We 
reversed the district court’s determination that there had been 
                                                                                                             
 
used in the law, and, although it has not by any means been 
given a perfectly consistent interpretation, it is generally 
understood to refer to conduct that is not merely negligent. 
The standard of willfulness that was adopted …–that the 
employer either knew or showed reckless disregard for the 
matter of whether its conduct was prohibited by the statute–is 
surely a fair reading of the plain language of the [FLSA].”  Id. 
at 615 (quoting McLaughlin, 486 U.S. at 133). 
  
 9 Compare the definition of outrageous – “[e]xceeding 
all reasonable bounds of human decency; extremely shocking, 
offensive, or unfair” – with the definition of egregious – 
“[e]xtremely or remarkably bad; flagrant[.]”  Outrageous & 
Egregious, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). 
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no willfulness in the failure to report, reasoning that the 
district court’s analysis had improperly focused on 
egregiousness.  Id. at 153.  We held that “the overall 
egregiousness of [the defendant’s] conduct … [was] not 
required to establish willfulness[.]”10  Id. (emphasis added) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  Referencing the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Safeco Insurance Company of America v. 
Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 57 (2007),11 we noted that, “where 
‘willfulness’ is an element of civil liability, ‘we have 
generally taken it to cover not only knowing violations of a 
standard, but reckless ones as well.’”  Id. at 152 (citation 
omitted).  
 
Thus, Supreme Court case law and our own precedent 
counsel against a standard for willfulness that requires a 
showing of egregiousness.  Troy has misread Souryavong, but 
that error, and the District Court’s, is understandable, given 
some of our language in that case.   
 
 In Souryavong, we affirmed a grant of judgment as a 
matter of law where the only evidence suggestive of 
willfulness was an email that postdated the two appealing 
employees’ overtime violations.  872 F.3d at 125-26.  We 
reached that conclusion after discussing the standard of 
willfulness, reiterating that “[t]he Supreme Court defines 
                                                 
 10 Reckless disregard may be satisfied through 
“evident indifference[,]” Martin v. Selker Bros., 949 F.2d 
1286, 1296 (3d Cir. 1991), and egregiousness is not necessary 
for an employer to disregard a meaningful possibility of 
violating the FLSA.  
 
 11 Safeco relied on McLaughlin, 486 U.S. at 132-33, to 
characterize the willfulness standard.  551 U.S. at 57.   
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‘willfulness’ to include situations when the employer, at the 
time of its FLSA violation, either ‘knew’ its conduct was 
prohibited by the FLSA or ‘showed reckless disregard for the 
matter.’”  Id. at 126 (citation omitted).  But then we posed a 
hypothetical.  Id. at 126-27.  We considered whether 
willfulness could be found if a particular piece of evidence – 
that email evidencing possible awareness of an FLSA 
violation – had predated the violations.  Id.  Within that 
hypothetical framework, we sought a comparison and said 
that “decisions from our sister circuits indicate that an FLSA 
violation must have a degree of egregiousness that is lacking 
[here.]”  Id. at 127.   
 
 That perhaps confusing detour was based on our 
review of cases from two other circuits.  Id.  First, we 
considered a Ninth Circuit case finding that “a jury question 
on willfulness [wa]s present when a city [wa]s well aware of 
the FLSA’s strictures” but “allow[ed] a misclassification of a 
monthly payment to continue for nine years.”  Id. (citing 
Flores v. City of San Gabriel, 824 F.3d 890, 896, 905-07 (9th 
Cir. 2016)).  Then, looking to an Eleventh Circuit case, we 
noted there was a jury question on willfulness “if a family 
fail[ed] to pay a nanny a minimum wage,” when evidence 
indicated that “the family ‘knew’ about minimum wage laws, 
… the family required her to work twice as many hours as the 
family claimed, … and instructed her to lie about her 
employment.”  Id. (citing Davila v. Menendez, 717 F.3d 1179, 
1182-83, 1185 (11th Cir. 2013)).  We compared those 
examples to Souryavong’s case and concluded that “nothing 
[here] indicates … [a] similar level of recklessness or ill will 
…. [or] manipulation and concealment[.]”  Id. 
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 Our consideration of a hypothetical and our discussion 
of egregious behavior in other cases should not, however, 
mislead litigants or district courts to believe we have 
established egregiousness as a prerequisite for finding an 
FLSA violation to be willful.  The language from Souryavong 
that Troy leans on is non-binding dictum, see Abdelfattah v. 
DHS, 488 F.3d 178, 185 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding that a 
particular requirement articulated in a prior decision was 
dictum when it had no bearing on the outcome of that appeal), 
and, importantly, if understood as Troy suggests, would be 
contrary to the Supreme Court’s instructions on the meaning 
of willfulness.12  See Hazen, 507 U.S. at 617 (“[T]he 
employee need not additionally demonstrate that the 
employer’s conduct was outrageous[.]”); United States v. 
Greenspan, 923 F.3d 138, 157-58 (3d Cir. 2019) (“[W]e are 
careful not to read our precedents to gainsay those of the 
Supreme Court.”).  Egregiousness is rightly thought of as a 
high-water mark, representing behavior that clearly 
establishes willfulness, as opposed to a baseline requirement 
for such a finding.  See, West v. Nabors Drilling USA, Inc., 
330 F.3d 379, 391 (5th Cir. 2003) (declining to read that 
Circuit’s precedent “to superimpose a heightened test of 
egregiousness on the requirement . . . that an employer must 
have known or shown reckless disregard for the matter of 
                                                 
 12 To the extent that Troy further contends that 
Souryavong requires an employee to prove willfulness only 
through direct—as opposed to circumstantial—evidence, we 
reject that interpretation as inconsistent with Hazen Paper.  
See Hazen Paper Co., 507 U.S. at 617 (“[T]he employee need 
not . . . provide direct evidence of the employer’s 
motivation[.]”). 
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whether its conduct was prohibited[.]” (citation, internal 
quotation marks, and alterations omitted)).   
 
 In sum, willfulness under the FLSA is established 
where “the employer either knew or showed reckless 
disregard for the matter of whether its conduct was prohibited 
by the [FLSA.]”  McLaughlin, 486 U.S. at 133.  It does not 
require a showing of egregiousness.  Hazen, 507 U.S. at 617.   
 
B. Genuine Disputes of Material Fact 
 Pertaining to Willfulness 
 
 When the proper standard for determining willfulness 
is applied, it becomes apparent that summary judgment 
should not have been granted because genuine disputes of 
material fact exist as to Troy’s willfulness.  Troy itself 
admitted that.  And statements made by its chosen corporate 
designee, Vice President and CFO Daniel O’Hare, as well as 
reasonable inferences derived from the record, confirm that a 
reasonable factfinder could say that Troy had been at least 
reckless in its accounting treatment of per diems and hence 
had been willful in violating the FLSA.   
 
 It is true that Troy’s 2014 change in tax accounting – 
treating per diems paid to local employees as taxable wages – 
post-dated the last of Stone’s paychecks, on March 15, 2013, 
but that does not mean that the change has no probative value 
here.  Drawing reasonable inferences in Stone’s favor, Troy 
acted to correct a previously understood incongruity in its per 
diem payment practices.   Having treated those payments as 
reimbursable expenses when, as paid to local employees, they 
were actually wages, Troy made the accounting change at a 
18 
 
time of its choosing, though its recognition of the need for the 
change may have come earlier.13   
 
 Even ignoring that change in accounting practices, 
however, there was sufficient evidence to create genuine 
disputes of material fact as to Troy’s willfulness.  Mr. 
O’Hare’s testimony demonstrated that Troy was aware that a 
“per diem is a reimbursable” (App. at 68), and that the 
reimbursement in question was for employee expenses related 
to traveling to the worksite, like travel, lodging, and food.  A 
per diem paid to a local employee with no such expenses is 
miscast as a reimbursement.  There is simply nothing of 
significance to reimburse.  Since the per diems paid to local 
employees did not reimburse travel expenses, it would be 
reasonable to conclude that Troy knew those payments were 
actually wages.    
 
 That Troy understood it was misclassifying wages for 
local employees could be inferred from its total reliance on 
employee self-reporting to catch unwarranted 
                                                 
 13 Policy concerns sometimes prompt the law to forbid 
later corrective action from being used as evidence, so as to 
not pose a disincentive to appropriate changes in behavior.  
See Fed. R. Evid. 407 (“When measures are taken that would 
have made an earlier injury or harm less likely to occur, 
evidence of the subsequent measures is not admissible to 
prove: negligence … .”).  Neither party suggests that Troy’s 
tax-accounting change falls within that prohibition, and we 
need not confront that issue now.  We merely note that, if 
presented with evidence of the accounting change, a rational 
factfinder could conclude that the change is probative of 
willfulness.  
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reimbursements.  Troy paid local employees per diems 
“unless [an] employee [told] [it] otherwise[.]”  (App. at 73.)  
Despite “often hir[ing]” local employees, (App. at 63,) Troy 
simply “assume[d] that [an employee is] an out-of-town 
employee and [it] [paid] the per diem[]” (App. at 73).  
Perhaps a factfinder will view that as an innocent act by a 
well-motivated employer.  But a factfinder could reasonably 
conclude that no sensible employer expects employees to say 
“don’t give me money.”  Because Troy adopted a blanket 
policy excluding per diems from all employees’ pay despite 
knowing that it “often” hired local employees, a factfinder 
could conclude that Troy had to know it was underreporting 
wages for that part of its workforce.  See Morgan v. Family 
Dollar Stores, Inc., 551 F.3d 1233, 1270, 1280 (11th Cir. 
2008) (finding the jury’s determination of willfulness legally 
sufficient where the employer “never studied” which 
employees were implicated under the FLSA). 
 
 Troy contends it did not have enough information to 
determine whether a per diem was appropriate because it is 
difficult to ascertain whether an employee is local or not, 
since employees often move temporarily.  But a jury might 
find unpersuasive Troy’s protestation that it could not 
determine which employees were, in fact, local.  The record 
makes clear that employees’ permanent addresses were 
provided to Troy and documented in the New Hire Forms.  
Troy reasons that it “did not know whether the address … 
listed [in the New Hire Forms] was a permanent address or 
just a [hotel or temporary] address … for the duration of the 
Troy project.”  (Answering Br. at 7.)  But Troy could have 
begun to figure out which employees were local, if it had only 
elected to look, and, if necessary, ask a question or two.  See 
Gagnon v. United Technisource, Inc., 607 F.3d 1036, 1042 
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(5th Cir. 2010) (finding no clear error in the District Court’s 
finding that an employer acted willfully, despite the 
employer’s argument that the employee “did not give [the 
employer] enough information about his address change or 
how much he required in per diem”).  In fact, Troy was able 
to determine where employees permanently resided without 
any apparent difficulty in 2014, when it started treating local 
employees’ per diems as taxable.   
 
 Finally, the size of the per diems payments could also 
reflect recklessness.  The per diems were not some minor 
fringe benefit, but rather constituted a considerable portion of 
local employees’ pay.   
 
 In short, drawing all reasonable inferences in Stone’s 
favor, even without evidence of the 2014 change in 
accounting practices, there is at least a genuine dispute as to 
whether Troy knew that per diems paid to local employees 
were wages that must be included in the regular base rate 
when calculating overtime pay.   Hence, it was not surprising 
that, while addressing Stone’s summary judgment motion in 
the District Court, Troy frankly admitted that “genuine 
disputes exist regarding whether Troy recklessly disregarded 
its FLSA obligations.” (D.I. 128 at 12.)  
 
 The District Court therefore erred in declaring that 
“there are insufficient facts for a factfinder to reasonably 
conclude that the defendant’s conduct amounts to something 
more than an ordinary FLSA violation.”  (App. at 10.)   That 
error means that the District Court also erred in applying the 
FLSA’s two-year statute of limitations and concluding that 
Stone’s claims were necessarily untimely.   
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C. Stone’s Claims Were Not All Necessarily 
 Time-barred 
 
To evaluate whether all of Stone’s claims were time-
barred, the District Court had to determine “the date on which 
this lawsuit commenced.”  (App. at 13.)  An FLSA collective 
action is commenced for an “individual claimant-- (a) … 
when the complaint is filed, if he is specifically named as a 
party plaintiff in the complaint and his written consent to 
become a party plaintiff is filed [therewith] … ; or (b) if such 
written consent was not so filed or if his name did not so 
appear-- … [when] such written consent is filed[.]”  29 
U.S.C. § 256.  It is an oddity that a plaintiff who files a 
complaint in her own name, unless she files a separate written 
consent, is not treated as consenting to join the very lawsuit 
she initiated.  See, e.g., Bonilla v. Las Vegas Cigar Co., 61 F. 
Supp. 2d 1129, 1139 (D. Nev. 1999) (stating it is “redundant 
and unusual to make named plaintiffs file their consents with 
the Court[,]” despite “the fact that th[os]e statutory 
requirements are repetitive or wasteful, they are the 
unambiguous requirements which Congress has duly 
enacted”).  Nevertheless, that is one of the shoals on the 
FLSA waterway, and parties must navigate accordingly.   
 
Deciding whether Stone’s claims are timely depends in 
part on whether her affidavit in support of conditional 
certification, filed on March 30, 2015, constituted a form of 
atypical, but acceptable, written consent.  Otherwise, Stone 
was relegated to the date of her formal consent-to-sue form, 
filed on March 22, 2016.  Stone argues that the affidavit was 
sufficient, while Troy counters that only the later filing served 
the purpose.  The District Court agreed with Troy.      
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 Despite acknowledging “considerable flexibility in 
what constitutes written consent[,]” the District Court 
concluded that Stone’s affidavit was insufficient because it 
did not “expressly indicate” a desire to consent to be a party 
plaintiff, “refer to a lawsuit,” or “mention any violations of 
the FLSA.”  (App. at 15-16.)  Rather, it was “merely a 
reiteration of facts surrounding [Stone’s] employment.”  
(App. at 15-16.)  Accordingly, the Court used the date of 
Stone’s later-filed consent-to-sue form to start the clock for 
the statute of limitations.  And based on that date, March 22, 
2016, and on its conclusion that the two-year statute of 
limitations controls, the Court held that “plaintiffs’ FLSA 
claim is time-barred[,]” so it granted summary judgment for 
Troy.  (App. at 16 .)   
 
Employees typically supply consent to join an FLSA 
collective action through a formal consent-to-sue form, but 
“[c]ourts have shown considerable flexibility in what 
constitutes ‘written consent’ as long as the signed document 
indicates consent to join the lawsuit.”  Manning v. Gold Belt 
Falcon, LLC, 817 F. Supp. 2d 451, 454 (D.N.J. 2011) (“With 
respect to form, courts have shown considerable flexibility as 
long as the signed document indicates consent to join the 
lawsuit.”).  Here, Stone filed her complaint on February 19, 
2014.  More than a year later, she filed her March 30, 2015 
affidavit, and, another year after that, she finally filed a 
consent-to-sue form, on March 22, 2016.  Troy, of course, 
contends that the statute of limitations bars Stone’s claim 
because her formal consent-to-sue form is the operative 
document and was untimely.  We agree that the affidavit does 
not qualify as a written consent, but disagree that Stone is 
necessarily out of court.  
 
23 
 
 While there is no uniform test to determine when a 
document adequately expresses an individual’s desire to be an 
FLSA plaintiff, courts have focused upon whether the 
document manifests, in some fashion, a clear intent to join the 
action.  See Montalvo v. Tower Life Bldg., 426 F.2d 1135, 
1148-49 (5th Cir. 1970) (where “the original document 
demonstrated clearly that the plaintiffs, by signing their 
names, had in fact given their consent to becoming plaintiffs 
in a suit for recovery under the Act[]” that document 
“constituted ‘written consent’ … sufficient to toll the statute 
of limitations[]”); Manning, 817 F. Supp. 2d at 454 (“In some 
cases, plaintiffs have been deemed to have manifested 
consent, although they did not submit the specific form 
approved by the Court.”); see also Ellen C. Kearns et al., The 
Fair Labor Standards Act § 17.II.B.2, at 16-17 (3d ed. 2018) 
(“a consent form must clearly manifest the individual’s 
consent to become a party plaintiff to the litigation.” 
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).)  Here, Stone 
says that her affidavit “asserted several facts supporting her 
claim that her co-workers were similarly situated with her 
with respect to her FLSA claims.”  (Opening Br. at 31.)  But 
the affidavit did not identify Stone as a party, it did not refer 
to this litigation, and it did not mention any violations of the 
FLSA.  Stone’s post-hoc characterization of the affidavit as 
an FLSA consent to sue seems to be wishful thinking.  With 
the benefit of hindsight, she no doubt wishes she had filed her 
consent sooner than March 22, 2016, but she did not, and the 
District Court did not err in concluding that the affidavit was 
not valid consent pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 256. 
 
 Nonetheless, because Stone’s FLSA claim is really a 
set of claims, those claims are not all necessarily untimely.  
The parties’ tolling agreement suspended the running of the 
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three-year statute of limitations for 14 days, saving two of 
Stone’s claims at the summary judgment stage.    
 
 For each payday where Troy “failed to pay” its 
employees “proper wages[,]” “a new and separate cause of 
action for unpaid overtime wages accrued[.]”  (App. at 12 
(District Court Opinion) (citations omitted)); see Hughes v. 
Region VII Area Agency on Aging, 542 F.3d 169, 187 (6th 
Cir. 2008) (“A[n] [FLSA] cause of action … accrue[s], as a 
general rule, at each regular payday immediately following 
the work period during which the services were rendered for 
which the wage or overtime compensation is claimed.” 
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).  As 
discussed above, the District Court erred in applying a two-
year statute of limitations to Stone’s claims.  Instead, because 
there are genuine disputes regarding willfulness, it should 
have assumed, for purposes of summary judgment, that the 
three-year statute of limitations applies and then asked 
whether Stone’s claims were timely.14  See Alvarez v. IBM 
Restaurants Inc., 839 F. Supp. 2d 580, 588 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) 
(“[G]enerally … where willfulness is in dispute, a three year 
statute of limitations applies[.]”)  
 
 Once the longer limitations period is taken into 
account, the effect of Stone’s and Troy’s tolling agreement 
                                                 
 14 In assuming willfulness for purposes of summary 
judgment, we in no way imply how that issue should be 
decided at trial.  To the contrary, we recognize that, should a 
jury find that Troy violated the FLSA but that willfulness was 
lacking, Stone’s claims and those of any plaintiffs beyond the 
two-year statute of limitations would be time-barred, 
precluding recovery on those claims.  See 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). 
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must be considered.  The District Court recognized that 
agreement in an order saying that “[t]he statute of limitations 
pertaining to the FLSA claim shall be tolled from April 13, 
2015 to April 27, 2015, at which time it will begin to run 
again.”  (App. at 104.)  Troy argues that the agreement “only 
applied to the claims of potential opt-in plaintiffs[,]” and that 
Stone was not a party of that sort.  (Answering Br. at 10 
(emphasis added).)  That argument, however, is unpersuasive.  
Neither the order enforcing the agreement nor the set of 
emails embodying the agreement imposed any such 
limitation.  Rather, those documents make clear that the 
agreement was for the parties’ mutual benefit and that Troy 
agreed to “toll the statute of limitations pertaining to the 
FLSA claim[.]”  (App. at 103.)  There is no indication that the 
agreement was intended to be solely or even primarily for the 
benefit of “potential opt-in plaintiffs.”  The tolling agreement 
benefited Stone and the potential FLSA class, and was given 
in exchange for Stone’s consent to Troy taking extra time to 
meet a filing requirement.  
 
 Stone’s last two paydays were March 8 and 15, 2013.  
For summary judgment purposes, those two paydays, 
providing a basis for separate causes of action, each initiated 
a three-year statute of limitations that was extended 14 days 
by the tolling agreement.  Thus, for the March 8, 2013, 
payday, she had until March 22, 2016 to file her consent-to-
sue form, and for the March 15, 2013, payday, she had until 
March 29, 2016 to do so, assuming that Troy willfully 
violated the FLSA and that the three-year limitation period 
applies.  Because Stone filed her formal consent-to-sue form 
on March 22, 2016, those two claims survive summary 
judgment.    
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III. CONCLUSION 
  
 In conclusion, the District Court erred in holding, at 
the summary judgment stage, that all of Stone’s claims were 
time barred.  Summary judgment in favor of Troy was not 
warranted because, assuming willfulness is established at 
trial, Stone had two claims that fall within a three-year statute 
of limitations, as extended by 14 days due to the tolling 
agreement.  We will therefore vacate the District Court’s 
grant of summary judgment in favor of Troy and remand the 
case for further proceedings. 
 
 
